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I. Introduction
In 1961, Florida joined the ranks of the growing majority of states
to mandate uninsured motorist coverage. This legislation resulted from
consumer outcry over the numerous hardships befalling accident vic-
tims injured by uninsured motorists. The Florida uninsured motorist
statute requires that an uninsured motorist endorsement be issued with
all liability insurance policies for the protection of persons injured by
financially irresponsible motorists." The statute, now designated section
627.727, does afford the insured the right to reject the uninsured mo-
torist coverage.2 However, unless the insured knowingly rejects the un-
insured motorist protection, the insurer is deemed to provide this cover-
age regardless of whether an extra premium is actually paid.'
Despite the obvious good intentions of this legislation, the Florida
uninsured motorist statute has been beset with problems from its incep-
tion. In particular, the insureds' statutory right to reject has produced
extensive litigation on the issue of what constitutes a valid rejection. In
such cases, insurers generally claim that the insured has rejected the
coverage. Policy holders, on the other hand, maintain that they were
never offered this protection or never effectively rejected it. The statute
provides no guidelines in this area whatsoever, and the courts have
struggled to be just in deciding the continual flood of uninsured motor-
ist cases.
The ability of this statute to protect consumers has been rendered
highly questionable in light of certain practices of the insurance indus-
try, the naivete of insureds, and the marked confusion in the Florida
courts. Insurers do not favor uninsured motorist protection, as evi-
l. FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (Supp. 1982). The uninsured motorist statute was origi-
nally enacted as section 627.0851, but, in 1970 was changed to the current section
number. FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (Supp. 1970).
2. FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (Supp. 1982). See Appendix for entire text of the
statute.
3. FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (Supp. 1982). See, e.g., Weathers v. Mission Ins. Co.,
258 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
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denced by their use of policies slanted toward discouraging such cover-
age, their failure to adequately explain the protection, and their at-
tempts to exclude or limit the coverage as much as possible. The
frequently mistaken assumptions of insureds regarding the nature and
scope of uninsured motorist coverage further compound the problem.
As presently applied, the "right" of rejection is really no right at all,
but merely a means utilized by the insurance industry to escape the
mandatory inclusion of uninsured motorist coverage in auto liability
policies. Florida courts have been reluctant to aggressively address
these various problems, apparently preferring purely legislative reform.
The latest legislative response was the Sunset Act of 1982 which
amended Florida Statutes section 627.727 by requiring that the rejec-
tion of this coverage be in writing. This requirement, however, is but
one step toward clarifying the uncertainties surrounding the statutory
right of rejection. The legislature and the courts of Florida must work
together to develop standards and policies to effectuate the intent of
this statute, and help rather than hinder those parties suffering from
the negligence of financially irresponsible motorists.
This note examines the statutory development of uninsured motor-
ist coverage in Florida and focuses specifically on various trouble spots
concerning the statutory rejection. The purpose of this note is to
demonstrate the seriousness of this situation and to offer specific guide-
lines to help clarify the vagueness of this subject.
II. Origin of Uninsured Motorist Coverage
In the prosperity following World War II, the manufacture and
sale of automobiles was considerably expanded. Not surprisingly, there
was a rise in auto accidents contemporaneous with the increased num-
ber of vehicles on the nation's highways. Unfortunately, the innocent
accident victim was often virtually without remedy where a tortfeasor
neither carried insurance nor possessed sufficient assets to discharge his
obligations arising from his tort liability.'
Although this problem became increasingly evident during the
4. FLA. STAT. § 627.727(1) (Supp. 1982).
5. See generally 3 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE, § 24.01-24.05
(revised ed. 1983); P. PRETZEL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS 1-5 (1972); 2 I. SCHERMER,
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE § 23.01 (revised ed. 1983); A. WIDISS, A GUIDE
TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 3-17 (1970); Donaldson, Uninsured Motorist
Coverage, 34 INS. COUNCIL J. 57 (1967).
[Vol. 8
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1940s and 1950s, it had nevertheless existed since the advent of the
automobile many years earlier. The initial legislative response consisted
of the enactment of financial responsibility laws.6 These laws, enacted
as early as 1925, typically required a motorist to establish proof of fu-
ture financial responsibility following an auto accident or face revoca-
tion or suspension of his driving privileges.7 The inadequacy of these
laws soon became evident: they allowed the irresponsible motorist one
"free" accident, and left the victim of the first accident without com-
pensation. For the next thirty years, state legislatures attempted to for-
mulate methods to resolve the inequities in the financial responsibility
scheme. Various forms of insurance legislation engineered to compen-
sate those injured by uninsured motorists proved unsatisfactory as the
numbers of uninsured motorists escalated in the post World War II
era. Increasing pressure was imposed upon state legislatures to imple-
ment further remedial measures. 8 Suggested solutions included compul-
sory insurance laws, unsatisfied judgment funds, and state-sponsored
compensation funds. The insurance industry was vehemently opposed to
such reforms and actively lobbied against them.9 These pronounced ef-
forts "to prevent 'further socialization of insurance' and government
intervention" was most noticeable in the 1953-54 debates in the New
York legislature.10
By 1954, the New York legislature had gained recognition as the
nation's focal point on the financially irresponsible motorist problem.
The insurance industry feared the precedential effect New York's reso-
lution might have on the rest of the country and for almost a year
succeeded in stymieing the passage of a compensatory automobile in-
surance program. Nevertheless, the industry was undoubtedly aware
that this was not a problem that would bury itself and that compulsory
automobile insurance might soon become a reality. Thus, after a year-
long deadlock in the legislature, the insurance industry introduced a
new endorsement to the standard auto liability policy."' Through the
proposed endorsement offered on an optional basis, insureds would be
6. See supra note 5.
7. Id. Connecticut was the first state to enact such a law. 1925 Conn. Pub. Acts
ch. 183 (repealed 1927). New Hampshire followed this lead and passed a similar law
one year later. 1926 N.H. Laws ch. 54.1.
8. See supra note 5.
9. A. WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 11 (1970).
10. 3 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE, § 24.04 at 24-7 (revised ed.
1983).
11. See supra note 9, at 12, 13.
19831
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indemnified for losses perpetrated by uninsured motorists. If an insured
was without'fault and injured he would be compensated when the
tortfeasor was either uninsured, underinsured, or a hit-and-run driver.12
The majority of states adopted this form of coverage although, only two
years following these debates, 'New York enacted a compulsory insur-
ance requirement. 13 In subsequent years, the National Bureau of Casu-
alty Underwriters made this coverage, commonly known as Uninsured
Motorist Coverage or Family Protection Insurance, available through-
out the United States.1 4 State legislation has made the coverage
mandatory in almost all jurisdictions, but often the insured is granted
the statutory option to reject the coverage.15
In light of the significant amount of litigation in this area, the fact
that the insurance industry itself created and promoted this type of un-
insured motorist coverage should be kept in mind. 6 The insurance in-
dustry was wary that consumer-backed legislation might adversely af-
fect its prosperity, and thus devised this new coverage to appease the
appetites of concerned legislatures. Over the years it has become appar-
ent that uninsured motorist protection has neither gained favor nor
been encouraged by the industry and insurers continually attempt to
deny or curtail this coverage through manipulation of statutory vague-
ness. The problems that this statutory vagueness has spawned are illus-
trated in the remainder of this note. The Florida legislature's response
is examined in the following section.
III. Florida Legislative History
Case law has served to flesh out the ambiguities and inadequacies
that have appeared and often reappear in the amendments to the unin-
sured motorist statute. The Florida legislature has responded by taking
a piecemeal approach in trying to remedy the various controversies as
they arise. The legislature has complacently withheld pronouncement
on those uninsured motorist issues receiving attention in the courts un-
til a legislative response is absolutely imperative. This section explores
the substantive legislative amendments affecting uninsured motorist
coverage and illustrates the legislature's somewhat tedious, step-by-step
12. 12-A G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 45:620 (2d ed. 1981).
13. A. WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 14 (1970).
14. Id. at 14, 15.
15. Id. at 127-129.
16. Id. at 16, 17.
[Vol. 8
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approach in developing answers to uninsured motorist problems.
In 1961, Florida Statutes section 627.0851 introduced uninsured
motorist coverage in Florida by providing that no automobile liability
insurance would be delivered or issued for delivery in Florida unless
coverage was "provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less
than the limits described in section 324.021(7) . . .for the protection
of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover dam-
ages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles." 17 The stat-
ute also provided that this required coverage would be inapplicable if
any insured named in the policy rejected the coverage.18 The 1961 law,
less than one-half the length of the present statute, left many areas of
uninsured motorist coverage statutorily undefined. Although the statute
granted the insured the right to reject the protection, it was silent as to
the elements and form of the rejection. Furthermore, the statute con-
tained no provisions regarding the available amounts of coverage in ex-
cess over the statutory minimum or the applicability of the coverage
requirements to renewal policies. In the years to follow legislative
amendments focused on these areas.
In 1963, Florida Statutes section 627.0851 was amended to fur-
ther provide that, absent a written request by the insured, uninsured
motorist protection need not be provided in or made supplemental to a
renewal policy if the named insured had previously rejected the cover-
age in an earlier policy issued by the same insurer.19 Thereafter, a
steady increase in litigation concerning uninsured motorist coverage re-
newal policies resulted, peaking in the late 1970s and early 1980s.20
17. FLA. STAT. § 627.0851 (1961). This act was effective July 1, 1961. Florida
Statutes section 324.021(7) referred to in the statute is the Florida Financial Responsi-
bility Law. In 1961, it required proof of financial responsibility in the amount of
$10,000 for bodily injury or death to one person, $20,000 for the injury or death of two
or more persons, and $5,000 for injury to or destruction of property to others.
18. FLA. STAT. § 627.0851(1) (1961).
19. 1963 Fla. Laws ch. 63-148.
20. The conflict involving renewal policies arose when the insured added a vehi-
cle or replaced or substituted a vehicle. A new rejection was not required unless there
was a material change in the policy. However, courts often found that changes consti-
tuted material differences making a new rejection necessary. See, e.g., Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. co. v. Sheffield, 375 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979). In Hart-
ford, the insurer issued the insured a liability policy with the minimum limits, at which
time she executed a written rejection of uninsured motorist coverage. Near the end of
the policy period the insured complained of high premiums. The insurer responded by
offering to change the policy limits due to the legislature's intervening amendment low-
ering the minimum limits. The insured executed a policy change request and was is-
1983]
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The confusion arose because the district courts were not uniform in
their determinations of what constituted a renewal policy. The 1980
amendment halted the extensive litigation on this subject by expanding
this exception to encompass any policy that extends, changes, super-
sedes, or replaces any existing policy.2"
sued a second policy without being offered, or rejecting, the uninsured motorist protec-
tion. Subsequently, the insured was injured and the issue arose as to whether the
second policy was a renewal or a new policy. The court relied on United States Fire
Ins. Co. v. Van Iderstyne, 347 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977), in holding
that it was not a renewal policy because of differences in premium and coverage. The
Van Iderstyne court had held that an endorsement to a policy adding an automobile for
an additional premium was a "separate and severable contract" requiring a new offer-
ing of uninsured motorist coverage. Id. at 673. Cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Glover, 202 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967). Thus Hartford established the
test that "if the original policy has been changed in any material respect then the
policy is new rather than a renewal." Spaulding v. American Fire & Indem. Co., 412
So. 2d 367, 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (quoting Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co. v. Sheffield, 375 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979)). In situations involving
replacements or substitutions of vehicles the trend was to follow State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bergman, 387 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980), petition for
rev. denied, 394 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1981), per curiam aftd, 408 So. 2d 1043 (Fla.
1982), which held that once an insured rejected full coverage under the uninsured mo-
torist portion of a policy he need not reject such coverage again when he buys a re-
placement vehicle. See United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Wain, 395 So. 2d 1211
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981), petition for rev. denied, 407 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 1981);
Kenilworth Ins. Co. v. McCormick, 394 So. 2d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1981). Applying the Hartford test, such a policy change was not considered material
and the policy was merely a "renewal" rather than a "new" policy. Wain, 395 So. 2d
at 1214.
The results were not as consistent in cases involving additions of vehicles. There
was a divergence of authority between the Fourth District and the other districts. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal relied on Van Iderstyne, Hartford, and Wain, and
held that an addition of automobiles with a commensurate increase in premiums consti-
tuted a material change and therefore was outside the renewal exception of the statute.
Spaulding v. American Fire & Indem. Co., 412 So. 2d 367, 370-371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981), modified, 8 Fla. L. W. 479 (Dec. 9, 1983) (No. 62,267). See also Kobert
v. Zarem, 437 So. 2d 730 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983). The First District rejected Van
Iderstyne and held that the addition of a vehicle by endorsement is not the issuance of
a new policy. Maxwell v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 399 So. 2d 1051, 1053
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981). The Fifth District followed Maxwell in Sentry Ins. A
Mut. Co. v. McGowan, 425 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982). See also Rhodes
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 437 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Cote v.
American Fire & Casualty Co., 433 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
21. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-396. See House Comm. on Insurance, Bill Analysis on
Uninsured Motorists Coverage, House Bill 1175 (sponsored by Rep. Gallagher) (April
17, 1980); stating that once enacted, this amendment would effectively overrule
6
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It was not until ten years after the enactment of the original stat-
ute that a provision specifying maximum coverage limits was added.
Unfortunately, the language adopted by the legislature was susceptible
to two interpretations regarding the actual amounts of the limits. Con-
sequently, the courts had to wrestle with yet another ambiguity in the
statute.22 This 1971 amendment required minimum coverage in an
amount that was set forth in the financial responsibility law and also
required coverage be provided "in an amount up to one hundred per-
cent (100%) of the liability insurance purchased by the named insured
for bodily injury." 23 Thus, the required limits were raised to 100% of
the bodily injury limits and the named insured could reject the entire
coverage or a portion thereof. Furthermore, the amendment provided
that a long term lessee who is named insured in a policy or on a certifi-
cate of a master policy issued to the lessor shall have the sole right to
Hartford.
22. 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-88 stated in part:
No automobile liability insurance. . . shall be delivered or issued for de-
livery in this state. . unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental
thereto, in not less than limits described in 324.021(7), and in amount up
to one hundred percent (100%) of the liability insurance purchased by the
named insured for bodily injury ...
After the 1971 Act went into effect, courts found the new coverage requirements am-
biguous as to the amount of coverage an insured was actually entitled to unless re-
jected. The problem was in determining the meaning of the phrase "in an amount up
to." In Garcia v. Allstate Ins. Co., 327 So. 2d 784, 786 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976),
cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1977), the court interpreted these terms as providing
a minimum (the financial responsibility limits) and a maximum (the bodily injury lim-
its). However, the majority of courts in construing the statute as a whole, held that it
provided uninsured motorist coverage equal to the bodily injury limits absent an offer
or rejection. First State Ins. Co. v. Stubbs, 418 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1982), petition for rev. denied, 426 So. 2d 26, 29 (Fla. 1983); Lumbermen's Mut.
Casualty Co. v. Beaver, 355 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. dismissed,
362 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1978); Riccio v. Allstate Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1978); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Baer, 334 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1976). To construe the amendment otherwise, noted Judge Anstead concurring in
Lumbermen's, would create no change in the statute "other than to impose a limitation
on the amount of such insurance that could be written." Lumbermen's, 355 So. 2d at
445. Furthermore, this interpretation would "be completely contrary to the legislature's
action in requiring uninsured motorist coverage in all policies written in Florida and
would pose serious constitutional questions." Id. Arguably, in retrospect this interpreta-
tion was correct: the 1973 amendment clarified the coverage requirements which con-
form to the holdings of the majority.
23. 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-88.
19831
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reject the uninsured motorist coverage."
Two years later, the legislature amended the coverage require-
ments; obviously in response to the frustration courts were experiencing
in interpreting the meaning of the coverage requirements as set forth in
the 1971 statute. Under the 1973 statute the language was simplified;
the amendment required coverage not less than the limits of the liabil-
ity insurance purchased and also provided that the named insured
could select lower limits.2 5
Many uninsured motorist statutes contain provisions for the
purchase of optional uninsured motorist coverages which are in excess
of the standard limits. In 1976, Florida adopted such a provision. Prior
to the amendment, the insurer had to offer uninsured motorist coverage
at least equal to the bodily injury limits. Effective October 1, 1976, the
insurer was required to make available "limits up to $100,000. each
person, $300,000. each occurrence, irrespective of the limits of the bod-
ily injury liability purchased" 6 at the written request of the insured.
24. 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-88 states in part:
where a vehicle is leased for a period of one (1) year or longer and the
lessor of such vehicle by the terms of the lease contract provides liability
coverage on the leased vehicle in a policy wherein the lessee is a named
insured or on a certificate of a master policy issued to the lessor, the lessee
of such vehicle shall have the sole privilege to reject uninsured motorist's
coverage....
See Padron v. H.W.G. Leasing, Inc., 436 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dwyer, 421 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982), petition
for rev. denied, 431 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1983); Midland Ins. Co. v. Hochberg, 394 So. 2d
449 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981), petition for rev. denied, 402 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1981).
The 1971 statute limited "uninsured motorist and insolvent insurers coverage to
the excess over and not duplicative of benefits available from those liable for the acci-
dent, auto liability, or medical coverage, or from workers compensation." Staff of Sen-
ate Comm. on Insurance, Staff Analysis on Automobile Liability Insurance; Senate Bill
225, companion to House Bill 276, (sponsored by Sen. Thomas). See also 1971 Fla.
Laws ch. 71-88.
25. 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-180. The statute was not retroactive. Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Baer, 334 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
26. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-266 read:
(2) The limits of uninsured motorist coverage shall not be less than the
limits of bodily injuiy liability insurance purchased by the named insured
or such lower limit complying with the company's rating plan as may be
selected by the named insured, but in any event, the insurer shall make
available, at the written request of the insured, limits up to $100,000 each
person, $300,000 each occurrence, irrespective of the limits of bodily in-
jury liability purchased, in compliance with the company's rating plan.
[Vol. 8
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From the time of the passage of the 1963 amendment creating the
renewal exception to the mandatory coverage requirement until 1980,
the courts attempted to decipher the difference between a new and a
renewal policy. The results during this seven-year period were highly
inconsistent. Apparently, the legislatiure concluded that this matter
could not be resolved in the courts and thus included in the 1980
amendment a provision which by its very terms served to clarify the
legislative intent as to the treatment of renewal policies. Prior to this
amendment, coverage need not have been provided in or supplemental
to a renewal policy. This act further extended this exception to apply to
"any other policy which extends, changes, supersedes, or replaces an
existing policy issued to him by the same insurer. ' 27 Furthermore, ef-
fective October 1, 1980, the insurer was required to notify the named
insured annually of his options as to the statutorily required coverage.
Notice was to be part of the premium and "shall provide for a means
to allow the insured to request such coverage and shall be given in a
manner approved by the Department of Insurance. '28
The most recent legislation on uninsured motorist coverage was
the Sunset Act of 1982.29 Three substantive changes affecting Florida
Statutes section 627.727 were made. Most importantly, this amend-
ment introduced the requirement that rejections of uninsured motorist
coverage must be in writing.30 This provision is another legislative re-
27. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-396. For a discussion on the case law development
which led to the passage of this amendment see supra note 20.
28. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-396. See Ferrigno v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 426
So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
29. 1982 Fla. Laws ch. 82-243.
30. Id. at 627.727(1). The requirement of a written rejection of uninsured motor-
ist coverage is clearly in response to the extensive litigation concerning whether an oral
or written rejection was required. In 1978, the First District, in Glover v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 363 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978), held that an oral rejection of unin-
sured motorist coverage was sufficient due to the absence of any statutory requirements
as to its specific form. The court noted that although the State Insurance Department
had issued Bulletin 586 requiring a written rejection, this regulation was not effective
when the policy in Glover had been written. On the Federal court level, the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court, in Harris v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 569 F.2d 850 (5th Cir.
1978), had previously upheld the regulation but the Glover court noted that no state
court had yet considered its validity. Glover, 363 So. 2d at 13. Following Glover and
Harris there was a wide split of authority on this issue. A number of courts elected to
mandate a written requirement. See Decker v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 392 So. 2d 965, 966
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), petition for rev. denied, 399 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 1981);
Cohen v. American Home Assurance Co., 367 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1979), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1979); American Motorist Ins. Co. v. Wein-
1983]
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sponse to an ambiguity in the statute. For several years preceding this
amendment courts throughout the state were divided on the issue of
whether an oral rejection was statutorily sufficient. The amendment
also expanded upon the notice requirements originally set forth in the
1980 amendment and further required that the insurer annually notify
the insured of the availability of uninsured motorist coverage and the
new excess coverage. Additionally, the Act created a new coverage re-
ferred to as "Excess Underinsured Motorist Coverage."31 As long as
the insured has damages to justify recovery, he may collect the entire
amount of his excess underinsured coverage in addition to, but not re-
duced by, the other party's liability coverage. This coverage is a type of
uninsured motorist coverage but is not to be construed as uninsured
motorist coverage on excess policies. Lastly, the Act extended the pe-
riod offering protection against the insolvency of the liability insurer
from one year to four years to conform with the statute of limitations
for negligence.3 2
IV. Practices Which Frustrate the Statutory Purpose
Pursuant to Florida Statutes section 627.727, uninsured motorist
coverage is included in every auto liability policy unless it is specifically
rejected in clear terms by an insured named in the policy.33 However,
garten, 355 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty
Co. v. Beaver, 355 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. dismissed, 362 So.
2d 1054 (Fla. 1978). Other courts did not require a written rejection where the absence
of coverage was not disputed by the insurance carrier and the contracting insured. See
Del Prado v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 400 So. 2d. 115 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981),
petition for rev. dismissed, 407 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 1981); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Wright, 406 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981), petition for rev. denied, 413
So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1982). Many courts followed the lead of Glover. See Kimbrell v.
Great Am. Ins. Co., 420 So. 2d 1086, 1088 (Fla. 1982), aft'd, 428 So. 2d 254 (Fla.
1982); Lane v. Waste Management Inc., 432 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Richmond v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 420 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982),
petition for rev. denied, 426 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1983); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 397
So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981). It is relevant to note that in Del Prado v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 400 So. 2d at 115, the court stated that if there was a "statutory
or other administratively imposed obligation to secure a written rejection, certainly the
named insured can waive this requirement which was designed for its protection. Statu-
tory rights can be waived." Id. at 116.
31. 1982 Fla. Laws ch. 82-243 at 627.727(4).
32. Id. at 627.727(2).
33. FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (Supp. 1982). See Weathers v. Mission Ins. Co., 258
So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972). This rule applies to excess or umbrella poli-
[Vol. 8
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aside from requiring the rejection to be in writing, the statute provides
no guidelines for determining what is a valid waiver or rejection of this
coverage. Based on judicial interpretation, a rejection by a named in-
sured must be knowingly made to meet the requirements of the stat-
ute.3' 4 As evidenced by the abundant and confusing case law on the
issue of these rejections, the courts are unable to consistently discern
what exactly is a statutorily valid rejection. Absent additional clarifica-
tion, the issue as to what constitutes an informed or knowing rejection
is hopelessly unclear.
A. Elements of a Knowing Waiver
In uninsured motorist cases, the statutory rejection of uninsured
motorist coverage is also referred to as a waiver of such coverage. A
waiver is comprised of certain basic elements. The traditional definition
of a waiver is "the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known
right." 35 Therefore, one waiving a right must do so on his own accord,
in the exercise of free choice, and with knowledge of the nature of the
waived privilege. Consequently, the validity of the waiver or rejection
necessarily relates to the content and the adequacy of the offer. "There
can be no informed rejection in the absence of an informing offer."'38 If
an insured "selects" lower limits of uninsured motorist coverage be-
cies as well. See Sirantoine v. Illinois Employers Ins. of Wausau, 438 So. 2d 985 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Chicago Ins. Co. v. Dominguez, 420 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1982), petition for rev. denied, 430 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1983); American Motor-
ists v. Bennett, 415 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Aetna Casualty & Sur.
v. Fulton, 362 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v.
Green, 327 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 1179
(Fla. 1976).
34. FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (Supp. 1982). Judicial interpretation of the statutory
rejection requires it to be informed or knowingly made. See Government Employees
Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 433 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Realin v. State
Farm & Casualty, 418 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Spaulding v. Ameri-
can Fire & Indem. Co., 412 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Brown v.
American Motorists Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert.
denied, 368 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1979); Wilson v. National Indem. Co., 302 So. 2d 141
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
Generally, a knowing rejection is a factual issue for the jury. Petrou v. South
Carolina Ins. Co., 435 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
35. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1751 (4th ed. 1968).
36. Spaulding v. American Fire & Indem. Co., 412 So. 2d at 371, quoted in
Realin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 418 So. 2d at 432; Lustig v. Colonial Penn
Ins. Co., 406 So. 2d 543, 544 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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cause the insurer failed to offer a higher amount equal to the liability
coverage and the insurer concedes it would not write the policy for the
higher amount even if requested, it can not be said that the rejection
was voluntary. 37 In these situations, the insured is not only uninformed
but is also deprived of his freedom of choice and is forced to accept the
policy on the insurer's terms or have no coverage at all. Thus, "take it
or leave it" offers by insurers cannot be met with statutory valid rejec-
tions by insureds."8 Likewise, if the insurer furnishes the insured with
false information as to the nature of the coverage, the purported rejec-
tion is ineffective.39
B. Failure of Insurer to Explain Coverage
A large percentage of laypersons applying for auto liability insur-
ance have very little or no knowledge as to the nature and importance
of uninsured motorist protection. To many insureds, this vague and un-
certain coverage simply means payment of an extra premium. Absent a
full and adequate oral or written explanation by the insurer, the in-
sured too often blindly rejects this valuable and relatively inexpensive
coverage.40
The Florida courts have been reluctant to respond to this problem.
In Lopez v. Midwest Mutual Insurance Co.,41 a fifteen year old minor
sued to rescind a written rejection of uninsured motorist coverage exe-
cuted by him as part of an insurance application. The plaintiff claimed
that the rejection was ineffective because he did not understand the
coverage involved, and because it was not explained to him. The waiver
provision in the application did not contain language which defined or
apprised the insured of the protection he was waiving, but was merely a
37. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Fulton, 362 So. 2d at 364.
38. Id. at 365.
39. Wilson v. National Indem. Co., 302 So. 2d at 141.
40. Frequently uninsured motorist waiver provisions are short statements on the
insurer's form reciting the relevant portion of the uninsured motorist statute requiring
this protection unless rejected. The voluminous case law on this issue indicates the
widespread confusion present in the judiciary in interpreting the statutory language.
Arguably it is unreasonable to expect an ordinary insured to adequately understand
this legislation and its extensive ramifications based on this technically formal language
found in most applications.
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single statement of rejection.42 The Third District Court of Appeal
ruled-in favor of the insurance company, stating that "the insurance
company has no duty to explain uninsured motorist coverage to an in-
surance applicant unless the applicant asks for an explanation. 43
Other states have responded to this situation by either judicially or
statutorily adopting certain objective standards to ensure a more know-
ing rejection. For example, some courts have held that the rejection
should contain a definition of uninsured motorist coverage which will
"clearly and specifically apprise the insured of the nature of the right
he is relinquishing" 44 in plain terms understandable to the layperson. A
single line on the carrier's form was held insufficient on its face to ful-
fill the requirement of a valid rejection. 5 Other courts simply require
the rejection to expressly refer to the concept of uninsured motorist
protection." The judicial rulings most effective to protect the insured
are those which require the insurer to orally explain the coverage and
record the substance of the conversation as evidence. 7
42. A block near the bottom of the application stated: "UNINSURED MOTORIST
COVERAGE: MUST BE INCLUDED WITH LIABILITY OR PACKAGE POLICY AT ADDI-
TIONAL PREMIUM OF $10.00, UNLESS REJECTED." The applicant was to sign for the
total premium. Above the line for signature were the words: "IN APPLYING FOR THIS
INSURANCE I SPECIFICALLY REJECT INSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE, UNLESS IN-
CLUDED IN THE PREMIUM ABOVE." Id. at 551.
43. Id. at 552. The Lopez rule has been followed in a number of other cases. See
Realin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 418 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1982); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Ltd. Corp. v. MacKenzie, 410 So. 2d
558 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982), petition for rev. denied, 419 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.
1982); General Ins. Co. of Florida v. Sutton, 396 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Alejano v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 378 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1979); Auto Owner's Ins. Co. v. Yates, 368 So. 2d 634, 638 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1979), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1979).
44. Dufresne v. Elite Ins. Co., 26 Cal. App. 3d 916, 924, 103 Cal. Rptr. 347, 352
(1972). See Bohlert v. Spartan Ins. Co., 3 Cal. App. 3d 113, 83 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1969);
Johnson v. Concord Mut. Ins. Co., 450 Pa. 614, 300 A.2d 61, 65 (1973). For similar
statutory requirements, see CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(a)(2) (Deering Supp. 1983);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3902(a) (Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 516A.1 (West
Supp. 1983); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 500.3010 (repealed October 1, 1973 by no
fault law).
45. Johnson v. Concord Mut. Ins. Co., 300 A.2d at 61.
46. Aldcroft v. Fidelity & Casualty of New York, 106 R.I. 311, 259 A.2d 408
(1969).
47. See Dufresne v. Elite Ins. Co., 26 Cal. App. 3d 916, 103 Cal. Rptr. 347
(1972); Hagar v. Elite Ins. Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 505, 99 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1971). See
also Johnson v. Concord Mut. Ins. Co., 300 A.2d 61 (1973).
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The Florida courts have not implemented any rule requiring an
insurer to explain this coverage and the Lopez holding is still fol-
lowed. 48 Furthermore, the present statute imposes a duty on the insurer
only to inform the insured of his statutory options regarding the
amount of uninsured motorist coverage.49
C. Mistaken Assumptions, Slanted Policies, and Exclusions
While providing an element of choice, the statutory opportunity to
reject uninsured motorist coverage simultaneously fosters many poten-
tial pitfalls for the insurance applicant. For example, insureds are often
under the mistaken impression that an insurance broker is an agent of
the insurance company. The general rule is that an insurance broker is
the agent of the insured rather than the insurer even though the broker
receives compensation out of the premium from the insurer.50 Thus,
even if the broker improperly rejects coverage51 or. selects lower limits
in signing for the insurance, 52 the insured is still bound by the rejection
regardless of whether the signature was authorized.
Another trap for insureds may lie in the policy application itself.
Frequently, insurance applications are slanted to discourage the
purchase of uninsured motorist coverage or to limit its scope by exclu-
sions. 53 A common method used is to describe the coverage as "addi-
tional" insurance requiring an "additional" premium. In Lopez,54 the
48. See supra note 43.
49. FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (Supp. 1982). Travelers Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 397 So.
2d 358 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981). If the insured has contracted for insurance in
amounts less than the highest limits available, it must be shown that he was offered the
higher limits in order for him to have effectively rejected them. Realin v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co., 418 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982). "The application,
by itself, is not evidence that the higher limits were offered." Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Jones, 414 So. 2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982); American Motorist Ins.
Co. v. Weingarten, 355 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978). But see Lumber-
men's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Beaver, 355 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978),
cert. dismissed, 362 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1978).
50. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Koven, 402 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); Auto Owner's Ins. Co. v. Yates, 368 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1979), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1979).
51. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Koven, 402 So. 2d at 1352.
52. Auto Owner's Ins. Co. v. Yates, 368 So. 2d at 634.
53. 2 I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE, § 23.04(3) at 23-12, 23-
13 (revised ed. 1983).
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application in issue contained several boxes which could be checked by
the applicant to select the coverages desired. An additional block at the
bottom of the application had to be checked if uninsured motorist cov-
erage was requested. Furthermore, the insured himself was required to
add the additional premium for the uninsured motorist coverage to the
package policy applied for. 55
The Third District Court of Appeal acknowledged that these pro-
visions encouraged the applicant to order insurance without the unin-
sured motorist coverage and that the provisions demonstrated to the
applicant that he would pay less by rejecting the coverage. The Lopez
court stated that the provisions would better effectuate the purpose of
the statute if the premium and the uninsured motorist coverage were
added automatically (unless a rejection were made), but upheld the re-
jection in the absence of statutory language requiring such provisions.5
The court commented that regulation of insurance companies, includ-
ing the establishment of requirements concerning the provisions of in-
surance applications, is not primarily a concern of the judicial branch
of government.5 The court's attitude in Lopez is typical of the unwill-
ingness of the judiciary to become involved in devising regulations and
standards that might better protect the insured and effectuate the pur-
pose of the statute.
This judicial reluctance was also evident in the more recent case of
Daly v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.58 In Daly, the in-
surer's standard underwriting practice was to prepare a form for the
applicant's signature, on which form the uninsured motorist coverage
was already rejected. This was done prior to any discussion with the
applicant and required him "to reject the rejection" 9 if this coverage
was desired. The Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld the rejection
but stated that this practice violated the intent of the statute and ap-
pealed to the Department of Insurance and the legislature for attention
to this matter.60 A response to these situations from such agencies is




58. Daly v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 422 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1982). For another example of a "less than above board technique" used by
the insurer, see Realin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 418 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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tices and provisions void as contrary to public policy and the intent of
the statute.
Insurance policies often attempt to exclude from uninsured motor-
ist coverage certain individuals"1 and vehicles.6 2 The exclusions are
often couched in fine print and ambiguous language. In these cases,
courts should not read them as to exclude coverage. The purpose of the
statute is to protect persons injured by uninsured motorists who are
unable to make the injured party whole."3 The protection is designed
for the injured or damaged person and not for the benefit of insurance
companies or negligent motorists." In light of this purpose, courts must
avoid a construction of the statute which would defeat coverage.65 Fur-
thermore, they must liberally construe policies in favor of the policy-
holder, and strictly construe them against the insurer.66
V. "Full Coverage"
Another serious problem occurs when the insured claims he re-
quested "full coverage. 867 To most insureds, "full coverage" means un-
61. Salas v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 272 So. 2d I (Fla. 1972); Mullis v. State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1971); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Marino, 370 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Forbes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 210
So. 2d 244 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968); First Nat'l. Ins. Co. of America v. Devine,
211 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
62. Progressive Am. Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 428 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 397 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Mason, 210 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1968).
63. Brown v. Progressive Mut. Ins. Co., 249 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1971).
64. Id. at 430.
65. First National Ins. Co. of Am. v. Devine, 211 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1968).
66. Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Butler, 314 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1975); National Mer-
chandise Co. Inc., v. United Service Auto Ass'n, 400 So. 2d 526, 530 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); Zautner v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 382 So. 2d 106, 107 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1980); Quick v. National Indem. Co., 231 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1970).
67. General Ins. Co. of Florida v. Sutton, 396 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1981); MacKenzie v. Avis Rent-a-Car Systems Inc., 369 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1979), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1979), Riccio v. Allstate Ins. Co., 357
So. 2d 420 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Beaver,
355 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. dismissed, 362 So. 2d 1054 (Fla.
1978); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Darden, 338 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1976), cert. dismissed, 353 So. 2d 680 (1977), Garcia v. Allstate Ins. Co., 327
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insured motorist coverage in an amount at least equal to the liability
coverage. However, cases indicate that when the insured requests full
coverage, the insurer often omits the uninsured motorist coverage from
the policy. An insured's mistaken belief that he has this coverage is
sometimes reinforced by a coincidental increase in the policy premium.
Generally, the insured is ignorant of the fact that he is not covered
because when he signs the contract for coverage he is often unaware
that he is also rejecting the uninsured motorist coverage. 6 .
The law is unsettled on the question of whether a request for full
coverage will render the insurer liable for the optional uninsured or
underinsured coverages. A Kentucky court of appeal has held that a
request for full coverage did not require the insurer to provide the op-
tional coverages. e9 The Kentucky uninsured motorist statute, like the
Florida statute, only required the insurer to provide the additional cov-
erage when requested by the insured. The court held that the request
lacked specificity since there were numerous types of optional coverages
available such as fire, theft, or towing.70 Nevertheless, this case has
been strongly criticized because the court failed to distinguish a request
for the aforementioned peripheral optional coverages, which lack the
public policy interest in encouraging their purchase, from a request for
optional uninsured motorist coverages included in the statutory
financial responsibility scheme.7 1 A request for the former unrelated
coverages would not obligate the insurer to furnish them. 2 However, as
one commentator has stated, public policy concerns would support a
finding that a request for full coverage would require the inclusion of
the optional uninsured and underinsured coverages."3
So. 2d 784 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1977).
68. See, e.g., General Ins. Co. of Florida v. Sutton, 396 So. 2d 855. Such a
situation also raises the issue of the applicant's duty to read. Generally, "an applicant
may not contest his signed rejection of coverage by contending that he signed the rejec-
tion without reading it." Id. at 856. See also Barnes v. Mangham, 153 Ga. App. 540,
265 S.E.2d 867 (1980). Arguably, in many cases the insurer never offered the coverage
and thus the applicant's failure to read the application or policy and discover the ab-
sence of the coverage is immaterial. Additionally, certain waiver provisions are not
adequate to apprise the insured of the nature of the coverage and thus the insured
cannot knowingly reject the protection.
69. Flowers v. Wells, 682 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. App. 1980).
70. Id. at 180, 181.
71. 2. I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE, § 23.04(2) at 23-21.
(revised ed. 1983).
72. Id.
73. Id. Cf. Parker v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 395 A.2d 507, 510 (N.H. 1978).
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The interpretation of "full coverage" was an issue presented in
Riccio v. Allstate Insurance Co.;7 4 the Florida Third District Court of
Appeal reversed a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff's insurer in
an action for a declaratory decree. The court held that a jury question
was presented as to whether the insurer's undertaking to give the in-
sured full coverage included an obligation to provide uninsured motor-
ist coverage. However, in dictum, the court stated that pursuant to the
1972 statute that required uninsured motorist coverage in an amount
up to 100% of the liability insurance, full coverage would mean unin-
sured motorist coverage equal to the liability limits."
In the recent case of Miller v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,"8 the
plaintiff's employer had instructed its insurer to "fully cover" the
leased vehicles which the employees used in their business. Following
the accident, the total amount of uninsured motorist' coverage was de-
termined to be only $10,000. since the employer had limited this cover-
age to $10,000/$20,000. without notifying its employees. The Third
District Court of Appeal reversed a summary judgment in favor of the
insurer and interpreted the phrase "fully covered" as including the
"maximum limit of uninsured motorist coverage available under the
statutes of this state which under the particular policy, ...would be
$500,000." 7
Other states have adopted certain practices which can be used to
eliminate these problems. For example, statutory requirements have
74. Riccio v. Allstate Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
75. Id. at 422. This particular statute gave rise to some controversy over the
phrase "in an amount up to one hundred percent of the liability limits." Id. at 422,
423. While Riccio interpreted this to mean uninsured motorist coverage equal to the
bodily injury limits, the court in Garcia v. Allstate Ins. Co., 327 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1977), held that "full cover-
age" was any amount of uninsured motorist coverage between the financial responsibil-
ity limits and the bodily injury limits; one being a minimum, the other a maximum. In
light of the 1973 amendment clarifying the coverage requirements, Riccio is the correct
interpretation. That statute, as well as the present one, requires uninsured motorist
coverage not less than the bodily injury limits. The present statute, however, requires
the insurer to make available limits up to $100,000/$300,000 irrespective of the
amount of bodily injury limits purchased if requested in writing. FLA. STAT. § 627.727
(Supp. 1982). Although Riccio was remanded for a jury trial on this issue, the court's
dictum interpreting the meaning of "full coverage" should be given weight under the
language of the present statute.
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been imposed mandating that the coverage shall be called to the atten-
tion of the named insured at the time the policy is issued. Some Cali-
fornia courts require the waiver agreement to be entirely separate from
the policy and require an additional signature on the agreement.7 9
These rulings evidence judicial approval and encouragement of the
purchase of uninsured motorist protection and a desire to ensure that
the applicant is aware of all his rights and understands the conse-
quences of his actions.
VI. Available Optional Coverages
The Florida uninsured motorist statute provides that "the insurer
shall make available, at the written request of the insured, limits of up
to $100,000 each person, $300,000 each occurrence, irrespective of the
limits of bodily injury liability purchased."80 This is an optional cover-
age which is included in many of the states' uninsured motorist stat-
utes. Once again, the Florida statute offers little from which one can
discern the respective rights and duties of the insured and insurer as
conferred by this provision.
Where a statute requires the insured to request the optional cover-
age from the insurer, it is logical to "read into the statute an assump-
tion that the insurer must first advise the insured that such coverage is
available."81 This analysis would avoid placing an undue burden on the
insured to keep apprised of changes in insurance legislation. Once in-
formed of the optional coverage, the insurer should obtain a written
rejection if the insured chooses not to select the additional limits. How-
ever, if the insurer fails to make known to the insured the availability
of the increased limits, the issue i whether the insured will automati-
cally be entitled to the optional coverage. A determination that such
coverage would be included would be consistent with the intent of the
statute. Nevertheless, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Lustig v.
Colonial Penn Insurance2 indicated that such a finding would not be
78. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-259.01 (Supp. 1983). See Koenig v. Mission
Ins. Co. 106 Ariz. 75, 471 P.2d 271 (1970), Maryland Casualty Co. v. Wilson, 6 Ariz.
App. 470, 433 P.2d 650 (1967).
79. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Meritplan Ins. Co. 205 Cal. App. 2d 133, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 682 (1962).
80. FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (Supp. 1982).
81. 2 I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE, § 23.04(1) at 23-20 (re-
vised ed. 1983).
82. Lustig v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 406 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
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the proper result. In Lustig, the insurer provided the insured with a
brochure which indicated that the uninsured motorist coverage could
not be higher than the bodily injury limits which were $50,000.1
$100,000. The insured was not informed that uninsured motorist limits
of $100,000./$300,000. were available upon written request. The court
observed that despite the insurer's error, this would not entitle the in-
sured to a judgment finding his coverage to be $100,000./$300,000.
without a written request, or without a showing that the coverage
would not have been provided even if requested.8
Many states' statutes have been interpreted to impose a duty on
the insurer to inform the insured of the availability of the optional cov-
erage." This explanation should contain information regarding the ad-
vantages, nature, and scope of the optional coverage, as well as its pur-
pose and the cost it would entail. Even absent a statutory requirement
to communicate this information to the insured, it has been held that
the insurer has a duty to "make a commercially reasonable attempt to
explain the availability and operation of such coverage to their
insureds.''85
Additionally, while there are no cases to date, the new statutory
requirement of written rejections should equally apply to rejections of
the optional coverage. Because the statute requires that the insurer
"shall make available" limits in excess of the standard coverage upon
written request, he is once again in the position of the offeror. There-
fore, it is arguable that once the insurer offers the optional coverage
and the insured elects not to contract for the higher amount, the in-
surer should still secure a written rejection to satisfy the statute. Ab-
sent a written rejection, the insured should be entitled to the maximum
coverage allowed by the law.
VII. Persons With Statutory Authority to Reject
The Florida uninsured motorist statute. contains a provision ren-
dering the requirement of uninsured motorist coverage inapplicable
1981).
83. Id. at 544 n.2.
84. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. § 3902(b) (Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. §
3636(F) (Supp. 1983). See also 2 I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE, §
23.04(1) at 23-18 (revised ed. 1983).
85. 2 I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE, § 23.04(3) at 23-23 (re-
vised ed. 1983) (quoting Smedvig v. St. Paul Ins. Co., Henn. County Dist. Ct. (Minn.
2/9/80), file No. 745876 (Per Hon. Win. S. Posten)).
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when any insured named in the policy rejects the coverage in writing.86
In interpreting the statute, courts have drawn a distinction between the
designation "persons insured thereunder" and "named insured" or "in-
sured named."'87 The section of the statute creating coverage contains
the phrase "persons insured thereunder" which as interpreted has a
broad meaning to extend coverage. On the other hand, that portion of
the statute authorizing rejection uses the term "any insured named"
which has a very limited meaning and is only applicable to those per-
sons named in the policy.88 Courts have tended to liberally construe the
former portion regarding the extent of coverage and to narrowly con-
strue the latter portion regarding rejection, as it detracts from public
policy considerations."
Thus, the named insured alone has the power to accept or reject
the uninsured motorist coverage. Furthermore, "the decision of the
named insured accepting or rejecting uninsured motorist coverage is
binding on any additional insureds under the policy." 90 This rule has
been viewed as simply practical in light of the waiver problem; to hold
otherwise would require the insurer to obtain rejections from all addi-
tional insureds and permissive users.9 1 While this analysis may be valid,
the rule nevertheless works a hardship on those additional insureds who
assume the existence of this coverage. When injured, these insureds
suddenly discover that this protection has been waived by the policy
holder.
The statute contains no provisions for notice to the additional in-
sureds; therefore, there is no duty to communicate a waiver of the unin-
sured motorist protection to additional insureds.9 2 Generally, in a fam-
ily situation, this will not pose much of a problem because of the close
relationship. There is a likelihood that a consensus was reached among
86. FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (Supp. 1982).
87. Weathers v. Mission Ins. Co., 258 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966);
Kohly v. Royal Indem. Co. 190 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966), cert. denied,
200 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1967).
88. Weathers v. Mission Ins. Co., 258 So. 2d at 277; Kohly v. Royal Indem. Co.,
190 So. 2d at 819.
89. See, e.g., Protective v. National Ins. Co. of Omaha v. McCall, 310 So. 2d
324 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Weathers v. Mission Ins. Co., 258 So. 2d at 277.
90. Whitten v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. 410 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1982).
91. 12-A G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW, § 45:627 (2d ed. 1981).
92. Darnaby v. Greenstein Trucking Co., 425 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
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the insureds in the selection of coverage or there is at least an aware-
ness as to the contents of the policy.9 3 However, in a commercial set-
ting the rule can have unfair results. The most common cases involve
corporations and car rental agencies. In the former instance, employers
frequently waive the protection for their employees who are usually en-
gaged in an occupation requiring the use of a vehicle. In the car rental
situations, the rented vehicle is typically insured for liability, but les-
sees are commonly unaware that uninsured motorist coverage has been
previously rejected by the lessor.94 Since the waiver is typically not
communicated to the employee or lessee, there is not an opportunity for
the individual to obtain additional protection through an agreement
with the named insured or through a collateral policy. Once again, the
usual judicial response is to acknowledge the problem but to avoid rul-
ing on the issue, instead calling for legislative action.95
Arguably, in the absence of requirements for communication of
the rejection and guidelines for the form of notification, the logical al-
ternative to eliminating this and numerous other problems plaguing the
rejection issue is to eliminate the right to reject entirely. 8 Courts have
stated that "[t]he statute does not contemplate a piecemeal whittling
away of liability for injuries caused by uninsured motorists," 97 yet ap-
parently this is exactly what is happening. Mandatory coverage may be
the best solution to preserving the original purpose and intent of this
93. Lancaster Oil Co. Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 486 F.Supp. 399
(N.D. Fla. 1980); Del Prado v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 400 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1981), petition for rev. dismissed, 407 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 1981); Maxwell v.
United States Fidelity & Guar., Co., 399 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Continental Ins. Co. v. Roth, 388 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Glover v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
94. Darnaby v. Greenstein Trucking Co., 425 So. 2d at 656; Guardado v. Grey-
hound Rent-A-Car, 340 So. 2d at 510; Kohly v. Royal Indem. Co., 190 So. 2d at 819;
Morpurgo v. Greyhound Rent-A-Car, 339 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976);
MacKenzie v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 369 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1979), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1979).
95. Kohyl v. Royal Indem. Co., 190 So. 2d at 819; Guardado v. Greyhound
Rent-A-Car, 340 So. 2d at 510. See also Riccio v. Allstate Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 420,
421-422 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
96. See A. WIDIss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE at 285
(1970), stating that "so long as the present system is maintained, it seems both justifia-
ble and desirable to eliminate the right to reject this coverage in order to assure protec-
tion for those classes of insureds who do not exercise a knowledgeable waiver of the
protection." Id.
97. See, e.g., First Nat'l Ins. Co. of America v. Devine, 211 So. 2d 587, 589
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
[Vol. 8
22
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 6
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss1/6
Uninsured Motorist Coverage
statute, namely, to protect insureds who fall victims to negligent and
financially irresponsible motorists.
VIII. What Constitutes Adequate Proof of Rejection?
Generally, whether the insurer offered the applicant the full
amount of uninsured motorist coverage and whether the insured has
knowingly rejected uninsured motorist protection or opted for coverage
in an amount less than his liability limits are issues for the trier of
fact.98 Nevertheless, it is not uncommon for these cases to be resolved
by summary judgment or directed verdict without submitting the issue
to a finder of fact. For example, in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Spen-
cer,919 the issue before the First District Court of Appeal was what type
of evidence was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the insurer had met the statutory requirement of offering the
insured uninsured motorist coverage. The Spencer court stated that
"[w]hen a statute commands that its provisions can only be met by
following a specific method, and the evidence reveals that its require-
ments were not observed, summary judgment is appropriately entered
because the controversy is considered one of law and not one involving
a disputed issue of material fact."1 °0 The statute requires an "affirma-
tive, informed rejection by an insured of his right to UM protection."101
Without extrinsic evidence, an informed rejection cannot be im-
plied merely from an insured's signature on the application for unin-
sured motorist coverage to lower the limits of this coverage.10 2 The
court's opinion in Southeast Title & Insurance Co. v. Thompson0 3 im-
plies that a rejection of uninsured motorist coverage may be inferred
from acceptance by the insured of a policy containing an endorsement
98. The issue of a knowing selection of uninsured motorist coverage is a matter
for the jury and not to be decided by summary judgment. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v.
Conner, 435 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
99. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 397 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
100. Id. at 360.
101. Id. at 361.
102. Zisook v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Fla. L. W. 2654 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. November 11, 1983) (No. 82-1972). Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., v.
Fulton, 362 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); American Motorist Ins. Co. v.
Weingarten, 355 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978). See also Lumbermen's
Mut. Casualty Co. v. Beaver, 355 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert.
dismissed, 362 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1978).
103. Southeast Title & Ins. Co. v. Thompson 224 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1969), rev'd, 231 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1970).
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which excludes all policy coverage for certain accidents although it
does not specifically mention uninsured motorist coverage. Such an im-
plication can be easily avoided by requiring the insured to reject the
coverage in specific terms. This would demonstrate that the insured
had at least been offered the coverage and would also satisfy the re-
quirement of written rejection.
In Kimbrell v. Great American Insurance Co.,104 the Florida Su-
preme Court stated that "the making of an express offer . . . is not
dispositive of the question of whether there was a knowing selection of
coverage limits." 10 5 The court noted that it may already be within the
insured's knowledge that such coverage is available without an express
offer by the insurer. Additionally, although it is relevant that the in-
surer maintains evidence of an offer, it is not critical in determining
whether a knowing selection was made.106
Frequently, the insurer will attempt to prove a rejection by testi-
mony of his unfailing practice to offer uninsured motorist coverage pur-
suant to Florida Statutes section 627.727, or of his general routine of
mailing notices to the policyholder of changes in the law.107 Such evi-
dence is admissible under the Florida Evidence Code.108 However, the
general rule as set forth in Jarrard v. Associates Discount Corp. by the
Florida Supreme Court is that:
in order to constitute proof of performance of an act on a specific
occasion, it is not sufficient merely to prove the habit, practice, or
custom, but there must also be proof that the practice was followed
in the particular instance in issue, and the evidence should show
performance of the practice by those then charged with it.109
104. Kimbrell v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 420 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1982), aff'd, 428 So.
2d 254 (Fla. 1982).
105. Id. at 1088.
106. Id. at 1089. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wright. 406 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1981), petition for rev. denied, 413 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1982).
107. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones 414 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 397 So. 2d at 358; Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., v.
Fulton, 362 So. 2d at 364; American Motorist Ins. Co. v. Weingarten, 355 So. 2d at
821. See also Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Beaver, 355 So. 2d at 441.
108. FLA. STAT. § 90.406 (Supp. 1982).
109. Jarrard v. Associates Discount Corp. 99 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1957) (emphasis
added). See also Scatigno v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 425 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1983); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 414 So. 2d at 1169; Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Spencer, 397 So. 2d at 358; American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Weingarten, 355 So.
2d at 821; Bernstein v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 294 So. 2d 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. Agp.
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In light of this rule, courts generally hold as a matter of law that the
statutory requirements are not met when evidence of a knowing rejec-
tion is founded on such testimony of routine practice.110
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jones,"" the Fifth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal went so far as to find that the insurer's testimony
of general routine was not only admissible pursuant to the evidence
code but was also sufficient proof under the rule in Jarrard. Appar-
ently, the only distinguishing factor present in Nationwide was that the
insurer alleged that, in addition to his custom of advising applicants of
such coverage, he was certain that he followed that procedure in that
case. He could not recall the exact language of the conversation but
was sure he had followed his routine. Thus, because the evidence code
does not require corroboration, the court found that this added asser-
tion provided the necessary proof that the practice was followed in the
particular instance. 12 The 1982 statute requiring a written rejection
will alleviate situations where the question is whether the insured actu-
ally rejected the coverage and arguably, such practices should not be
permissible.
IX. Conclusion
The Florida uninsured motorist statute section 627.727 has been
considerably expanded over the more than twenty years pince its origin
in 1961. In the area of rejection of uninsured motorist protection, un-
certainty still exists in spite of numerous amendments. Admittedly, the
recent 1982 amendment requiring written rejections is a step in the
right direction. Although rejections of uninsured motorist coverage
must now be in writing, litigation will continue to revolve around the
intricacies of the required "knowing rejection." The availability of ad-
ditional forms of optional coverages and the apparent need to obtain
knowing rejections for these coverages as well, will in all likelihood ag-
gravate the problem. Nevertheless, as uninsured motorist litigation
maintains its steadily increasing pace, it is obvious that much more leg-
islative and judicial structuring of the rejection procedure is needed. In
1974).
110. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 397 So. 2d at 358; American Motorists Ins.
Co. v. Weingarten, 355 So. 2d at 821. But see Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v.
Beaver, 355 So. 2d at 441.
111. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 414 So. 2d at 1169.
112. Id. at 1169, 1170.
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all cases, it must be remembered that the purpose of the statute is to
protect those injured through the negligence of irresponsible motorists.
The statute does not inure to the benefit of either the uninsured motor-
ist or the insurer. With the abundant confusion in this area caused by
insufficient guidelines governing the offer-rejection procedure, this leg-
islative intent is frustrated too often.
The existence of uninsured motorist coverage in serious accident
cases can be crucial. Damages are frequently in the six-digit range and
lack of insurance can have devastating effects. Because many misun-
derstandings between insureds and insurers stem from ignorance and
lack of adequate explanations regarding uninsured motorist protection,
a statutory duty should be imposed upon the insurer to fully explain
this coverage, including its purpose, benefits, and cost. It may be im-
practical to require an insurer to sacrifice valuable time in order to
orally explain the fundamentals of this coverage, however, a written
explanation on the insurer's form would be a reasonable alternative. If
after reading this explanation the insured had any questions, the in-
surer would be obligated to help answer his inquiries. Such a require-
ment would place no undue burden on either party. This requirement
could be effected by adoption of the following proposed amendment to
Florida Statutes section 627.727:
The coverage under this section shall be determined by a written
selection of each coverage signed by any named insured under the
policy. This selection of desired coverage shall be contained in a
separate agreement in which both the nature and scope of unin-
sured and underinsured motor vehicle coverage and the options are
explained in clear and understandable terms. The agreement shall
explain that this coverage gives the insured the same rights as if he
had been struck by someone with liability coverage. The agreement
shall inform the insured that the benefits of such coverage include
compensation for pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and
loss of earning capacity, as well as medical expenses and lost
wages. The amounts of the premiums for the available coverages
shall also be contained in the insurer's uninsured/underinsured mo-
torist agreement. The agreement shall inform the insured of the
available limits of these coverages and, absent a selection to the
contrary, shall require the insured to reject each and every cover-
age option. Additionally, the insured must separately select either,
or reject both, uninsured and excess underinsured motorist
coverage.
Although legislative amendments can undoubtedly cure part of the
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dilemma, this is not an area of purely legislative reform. In order to do
full justice to the statute's intent, Florida courts must follow the lead of
numerous states that have recognized the chaos and disorder inherent
in the statutory right of rejection, and which have implemented reforms
to correct the disparities. The task of the judiciary to interpret and
apply laws handed down to them in conformity with their expressed
purpose has been well established. Thus, when the legislative purpose is
clear, courts must resolve cases in a manner which furthers that objec-
tive. For example, when it is evident that certain insurance industry
methods, such as the use of slanted insurance policies, thwart this legis-
lative intent the judiciary should not hesitate to condemn and invali-
date these practices. The courts should not display any reluctance in
dealing with this well-acknowledged problem, but should initiate the
imposition of standards and restrictions to further ensure the fair and
just resolution of the vast amount of uninsured motorist cases. Legisla-
tive amendments coupled with judicial cooperation will hopefully lead
to more definite meetings of the minds between insured and insurer.
Karen E. Roselli
APPENDIX
627.727 Motor vehicle insurance; uninsured and underinsured vehicle coverage; insol-
vent insurer protection.
(1) No motor vehicle liability insurance policy shall be delivered or is-
sued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or
principally garaged in this state unless uninsured motor vehicle coverage is
provided therein or supplemental thereto for the protection of persons in-
sured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or
operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or
disease, including death, resulting therefrom. However, the coverage required
under this section shall not be applicable when, or to the extent that, any
insured named in the policy rejects the coverage in writing. When a motor
vehicle is leased for a period of 1 year or longer and the lessor of such vehi-
cle, by the terms of the lease contract, provides liability coverage on the
leased vehicle in a policy wherein the lessee is a named insured or on a certif-
icate of a master policy issued to the lessor, the lessee of such vehicle shall
have the sole privilege to reject uninsured motorist coverage. Unless the
named insured, or lessee having the privilege of rejecting uninsured motorist
coverage, requests such coverage in writing, the coverage need not be pro-
vided in or supplemental to any other policy which renews extends, changes,
supersedes, or replaces an existing policy issued to him by the same insurer,
when the named insured or lessee had rejected the coverage in connection
with a policy previously issued to him by the same insurer. Each insurer shall
at least annually notify the named insured of his options as to coverage re-
quired by this section. Such notice shall be part of the notice of premium,
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shall provide for a means to allow the insured to request such coverage, and
shall be given in a manner approved by the department. The coverage de-
scribed under this section shall be over and above, but shall not duplicate,
the benefits available to an insured under any workers' compensation law,
personal injury protection benefits, disability benefits law, or similar law;
under automobile medical expense coverages; or from the owner or operator
of the uninsured motor vehicle or any other person or organization jointly or
severally liable together with such owner or operator for the accident. Only
the underinsured motorist's automobile liability insurance shall be set off
against underinsured motorist coverage. Such coverage shall not inure di-
rectly or indirectly to the benefit of any workers' compensation or disability
benefits carrier or any person or organization qualifying as a self-insurer
under any workers' compensation or disability benefits law or similar law.
(2)(a) The limits of uninsured motorist coverage shall be not less than
the limits of bodily injury liability insurance purchased by the named in-
sured, or such lower limit complying with the rating plan of the company as
may be selected by the named insured; but in any event the insurer shall
make available, at the written request of the insured, limits up to $100,000
each person and $300,000 each occurrence, irrespective of the limits of bod-
ily injury liability purchased, in compliance with the rating plan of the
company.
(b) In addition, the insurer shall make available, at the written request
of the insured, excess underinsured motor vehicle coverage, providing cover-
age for an insured motor vehicle when the other person's liability insurer has
provided limits of bodily injury liability for its insured which are less than
the damages of the injured person purchasing such excess underinsured mo-
tor vehicle coverage. Such excess coverage shall provide the same coverage as
the uninsured motor vehicle coverage provided in subsection (1), except that
the excess coverage shall also be over and above, but shall not duplicate, the
benefits available under the other person's liability coverage. The amount of
such excess coverage shall not be reduced by a setoff against any coverage,
including liability insurance. An insurer shall not provide both uninsured mo-
tor vehicle coverage and excess underinsured motor vehicle coverage in the
same policy.
(3) For the purpose of this coverage, the term "uninsured motor vehi-
cle" shall, subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, be deemed to
include an insured motor vehicle when the liability insurer thereof:
(a) Is unable to make payment with respect to the legal liability of its
insured within the limits specified therein because of insolvency; or
(b) Has provided limits of bodily injury liability for its insured which
are less than the limits applicable to the injured person provided under unin-
sured motorist's coverage applicable to the injured person.
(4) An insurer's insolvency protection shall be applicable only to acci-
dents occurring during a policy period in which its insured's uninsured mo-
torist coverage is in effect when the liability insurer of the tortfeasor becomes
insolvent within 4 years after such an accident. Nothing herein contained
shall be construed to prevent any insurer from affording insolvency protec-
tion under terms and conditions more favorable to its insureds than is pro-
vided hereunder.
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(5) Any person having a claim against an insolvent insurer as defined in
s. 631.54(5) under the provisions of this section shall present such claim for
payment to the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association only. In the event of
a payment to any person in settlement of a claim arising under the provisions
of this section, the association shall not be subrogated or entitled to any re-
covery against the claimant's insurer. The association shall, however, have
the rights of recovery as set forth in chapter 631 in the proceeds recoverable
from the assets of the insolvent insurer.
(6) If an injured person or, in the case of, death, the personal represen-
tative agrees to settle a claim with a liability insurer and its insured for the
limits of liability, and such settlement would not fully satisfy the claim for
personal injuries or wrongful death so as to create an underinsured motorist
claim against the underinsured motorist insurer, then such settlement agree-
ment shall be submitted in writing to the underinsured motorist insurer,
which shall have a period of 30 days from receipt thereof in which to agree
to arbitrate the underinsured motorist claim and approve the settlement,
waive its subrogation rights against the liability insurer and its insured, and
authorize the execution of a full release. If the underinsured motorist insurer
does not agree within 30 days to arbitrate the underinsured motorist claim
and approve the proposed settlement agreement, waive its subrogation rights
against the liability insurer and its insured, and authorize the execution of a
full release, the injured person or, in the case of death, the personal represen-
tative may file suit joining the liability insurer's insured and the underinsured
motorist insurer to resolve their respective liabilities for any damages to be
awarded; however, in such action, the liability insurer's coverage, shall first
be exhausted before any award may be entered against the underinsured mo-
torist insurer, and any such award against the underinsured motorist insurer
shall be excess and subject to the provisions of subsection (1). Any award in
such action against the liability insurer's insured shall be binding and conclu-
sive as to the injured person and underinsured motorist insurer's liability for
damages up to its coverage limits.
(7) The legal liability of an uninsured motorist coverage insurer shall
not include damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconve-
nience unless the injury or disease is described in one or more of paragraphs
(a) through (d) of s.627.737(2).
(8) The provisions of s.627.428 do not apply to any action brought pur-
suant to this section against the uninsured motorist insurer unless there is a
dispute over whether the policy provides coverage for an uninsured motorist
proven to be liable for the accident.
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